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1. Introduction
We will consider stochastic differential games for the system governed by
stochastic partial differential equation (1.1),
(1.1) dX(t) = {AX{t) + β(X(t),Y(t), Z{t)))dt + dM(t), 0<t<T,
with initial condition X(0) — η (£ H),
where A is a uniformly elliptic differential operator, M a noise and Y and Z are
admissible controls of players. The pay-off J is given by (1.2),
(1.2) J ( ί , η;Y,Z)=E [ h(X(8),Y(8), Z(s))ds + q(X(t)), 0<t<T.
In our game, player I controls Y and wishes to maximize J and player II
controls Z and tries to minimize J. Using upper and lower semi-discrete approxi-
mations, we showed in [7] that their limit functions provided the unique viscosity
solutions of associated Isaacs equations respectively. But it was a problem whether
these limit functions coincide with the upper and lower value functions of game
respectively. The aim of this paper is to prove that the value functions are also
unique viscosity solutions of associated Isaacs equations (see Theorem 4.2). So the
upper (resp. lower) value function coincides with the upper (resp. lower) limit
function.
Let Wk, k = 1,2,. . . , be independent 1-dimensional Brownian motions. D
denotes a bounded and convex open domain of Rn with smooth boundary. Let
Y and Z be compact convex subsets of L2(D,RL) and L2(D,RM) respectively.
A process taking values in Y (resp.Z) is called an admissible control of player I
(resp. II), if it is Ft-progressively measurable and right-continuous paths with left
limits, where Ft is the σ-field generated by { Wfc(s), s<t, k — 1,2, •• }. Let us
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put Hk = H*(D), || ||* = its norm and H = H°(= L2(D)), || || = || | |0 for
simplicity.
When players I and II apply admissible controls Y and Z respectively, the
system X evolves according to the stochastic differential equation (1.1) on H and
the pay-off J is given by (1.2); We assume
^WΪ +Σn /(*)§ Φ)C Ceff1
β : H x Y x Z ^ H , and dM(t) is an H valued colored noise having
the form, dM(t) = ΣT=i V™kekdWk(t), with Σmk{— m put) < oo and
an orthonormal base e^  (G CQ°(D)), k = 1, 2, . Precise formulations and
assumptions are given in Section 2.
y (resp.Z) denotes the set of admissible controls of player I (resp. II). We
call a non-anticipative mapping a : Z ->> y (resp.7 : y -ϊ Z) an admissible
strategy of player I (resp. II). Denoting by A (resp. TV) the set of admissible
strategies of player I (resp. II), we define upper and lower value functions ( in
Elliott-Kalton sense) as follows,
(1.3) upper value function: U(t,η) = sup inf J(t,η m,aZ,Z),
(1.4) lower value function: u(t,77) = inf sup J(t,η ;Y,
Thus our main step is to show that these value functions are unique viscosity
solutions of the associated Isaacs equations (1.5) and (1.6) respectively (Theorem
4.2), employing similar arguments as [4], with B-norm (see (2.1)).
^(t,η) -(A*dU(t,η),η)- inf sup ((dU(t,η),β(η,y,z)) + h(η,y,z))
Cft z£Z
 y e γ
(1.5) - \trace Sd2U(t,η) = 0, 0 < t < T, η <E iJ,
Li
with initial condition U(0) — q
θu
— (t,η) ~(A*du(t,η),η)- sup ini ((du(t,η),β(η,y,z)) + h(η,y,z))
eft
 y e Y zez
(1.6) - -trace Sd2u(t,η) = 0, 0 < t < T, η e #,
with initial condition u(0) — q
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where A*= adjoint operator of A , S = linear operator on H defined by Sβk =
rrikek, k = 1,2, •••, d = Frechet derivative on H and ( , ) = duality pair
between H~ι and JT1.
As an application of our results, we will study small noise asymptotics of value
functions of risk sensitive control. Regarding a controller as player II, we consider
the following system ξε and the exponential criterion Jε',
dξε(t) = (Aξε(t)+δ(ξε(t),Z(t)))dt + y/idM{t\ 0 < * < T,
with initial condition £ε(0) = n
and
/Jε(t,η;Z) = Eexp(-  f(ξε(s)) ds).
ε Jo
The value function Wε and its logarithmic transformation vε are defined by
Wε(t,η) = inf• Jε(t,η;Z),
and
Then, i/ε is the unique viscosity solution of Isaacs equation (1.7), by the Legendre
transformation,
^ ( t , η ) - ( A fli/(t,q),η)- inf <fli/(*,q), δ(η, z)) - f(η)
- sup«&/(*,77), SO " J ^ C O ) - |*™ce Sd2v(t,η) - 0,2 λ
(1.7) 0 < ί < Γ, 77 G # ,
with initial condition i/(0) = 0.
In [6] we proved that the small noise limit of vε exists and its limit v becomes the
unique viscosity solution of (1.7) with ε=0. Moreover it coincides with the value
function of deterministic differential game on H. In this paper, we will construct
the associated game of (1.7) without passing to small noise limit, using our results.
So we can characterize vε as the upper value of the stochastic differential game
on H (Theorem 5.2). This yields the speed of convergence of i/ε, as ε tends to
0,(Theorem 5.3),
\uε(t,η) —1/(2,77) I ^ const.y/ε.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is preliminaries, where we give
precise formulations and assumptions and also recall some results on stochastic
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differential equations on iJ, for the later use. Sectin 3 is devoted to study
the properties of value functions. The relations between value functions and
Isaacs equations are investigated in Section 4, using the notion of viscosity solution.
Section 5 deals with risk sensitive control from the point of view of stochastic
differential games.
2. Preliminaries
Let (Ω,F,Fβ,P) be a canonical coodinate space with a standard Wiener
measure P, namely Ω is the path space {ω £ C([0,T], i?N), ω(0) = 0} endowed
with the usual product topology, where N denotes the set of natural numbers.
Hence it follows that the coordinate functions Wk(t,ω) = ωk(t), k — 1,2, ,
are independent 1-dimensional Brownian motions on Ω. FQ denotes the σ-field
generated by {ωk(s), s < θ, k = 1,2, •} and F = FT- Ocasionally we use
the probability space (Ωt, Ft,Fe,Pt), replacing T by t. Using the stopped path
ωf (s) = ω(s), s £ [0,t], and the shifted path ωf(s) - ω(s + t) - ω(t),s E
[0,T-t], we can identify Ω = Ω£ x ΩT-t and P = Pt x Pτ-t, by the
mapping Π^  : Ω -^ Ωt x Ωτ-t, Ut(ω) = (ω^,ω^~).
Let us assume the conditions (A1)~(A3) on A,
(Al). aιj and rι are bounded and continuous up to third derivatives
(A2). nxn matrix (aιj(x)) is uniformly positive definite, say
n
 a
ij(x)titj >λ
o
\t\2 for t=(tU'"tn), withλo>0
=l
(A3). c( ) is non-negative and continuous.
Then, from (A2) and (A3), it follows that -A is coercive, say
(-Aζ, ζ) > λ||C||i - ^||CI|25 with a positive λ.
The operator B : H ->- H2 defined by
(2.1) B = [I -(A- ^ n _ r{ — ) ] - 1 with boundary value 0,
is a compact operator on H and satisfies the structural condition
(-A*Bφ,φ) > \\\φ\f-p\φ\%
with a constant p > 0, where \ \B is called B-norm given by | φ \2B = (Bφ, φ).
When H carries B-norm, we denote H by HB> We will prove the strucural
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condition. Putting
Σ
n . Q
r
ι
 -r— and ψ = Bφ,
<=i dxi
we have
(-A*Bφ,φ) =\\Φ\? -\Φ\2B + Σni=i{^-{riψ),φ)
and
I the 3rd term \ < -\\φ\\2 + &| |^ | |IJ with a constant k.
Since (A2) and (A3) derive
\φ\2B = {φ, (I - L)φ) > HVII2 + λo||aVΊ|2 > mm.(l, λo)||VH?,
we can conclude the structural condition.
Moreover we assume (A4) ~ (A6), besides (Al) ~ (A3), putting | |i = norm
of Y and | | 2 = norm of Z.
(A4). β is bounded and Lipshitz continuous, say
4 = s u p | | / 9 ( C , y , * ) | | and \\β(ζ,y,z)-β(ζ,y,z)\\<H\\ζ-ζ\\ + \.y-y\1 + \z-z\2)
(A5). h is bounded and Lipshitz continuous, say
h = sap\h(ζ,y,z)\ and \ h(ξ,y,z) - h(ζ,y,z) | < ί(\\ξ - ζ\\ + \y -y |i + | z- z |2)
ζyz
(A6). q is bounded and B-Lipshitz continuous, say
q = sup\q(ζ)\ and \ q(ζ) - q(ζ) \ < ί\\ξ - ζ\\B.
C
Denoting by M2{Q,T\Hλ) the subset of L2((0,T) x Ω iJ1) consisting of Ft
-progressively measurable processes, we will define a solution of (1.1).
DEFINITION 2.1. X e M2 ((^T i/1) is called a solution of (1.1), if X <E
C([0,T]; H) a.s. and for any t and smooth function φ with support in D,
, φ) = (η, φ)+ [ (AX(s), φ) + (β(X(s),Y(8), Z(β)), φ)ds + (M(t), φ),Jo
with probability 1.
Now we have
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Proposition 2.1. There is a unique solution X( 77, F, Z) of (1.1) having
the following properties
E(«aτ>\\X(t;η,Y,Z)\\2 + ί \\X{s;η,Y,Z)\\lds) <
a n d
\\2ds) < K{\η \2| ( ) | ^ / | | ( ;η,Y,Z)\ 2 s)  
λ
{\η 2B + 1)
t<τ Jo
where K\ is independent of Y and Z.
Proof. Since we can see the first inequality in [8, Theorem 4 of Section 3],
we will only show the second one. Putting X(t) — X{t;η,Y,Z), we have, by the
structural condition,
d\X{t)\2B = 2(BX(t),dX(t))
+ (2p + ΐ)\X(t) \l + k)dt + 2(BX(t),dM(t)),
where k = m + β2. Hence integrating from 0 to t, we get the following three
evaluations,
2[ E\\X(s)\\2ds < I η \2B + kt + (2p + 1) / E\ X(s) \2BdsJo Jo
and
sup\X(θ)\2B<\η\2B + kt+(2p+l) ί \X(s)\2Bds+ 2sup [ (BX(s),dM(s)).
θ<t Jo θ<t Jo
Recalling the definition of dM and noting
pθ nθ pθ
E (BX(s),dM(s))2 <m E\\BX{s)\\2ds,<m I E\X(s)\%ds,
Jo Jo Jo
we see, from a martingale inequality
Esup /
Θ<T Jo
Combining the above calculations together, we can conclude the second inequality.
D
Since the dynamics of X(t 77, Y, Z) - X(t 77, F, Z) is independent of M( ), we
see
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Proposition 2.2. (see Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 in [7]). With probability
1, (2.2),(2.3) and (2.4) hold,
\2 /);η,Y,Z)-X(t;ή,Y,Z)\\2+  \\X(t;η,Y,Z) - X(t;ή,Y,Z)\\*ds
t<τ Jo
(2.2) <^2| |»7-^| | 2
\\X(t;η,Y,Z)-X(t;ή,Y,Z)\\2ds\% [
t<τ Jo
(2.3) <K2\η-ή\2B,
with K2 independent of Y, Z and ω G Ω,
\X(t;η,Y,Z)-X(t;η,Ϋ,Z)\2B<\\X(t;η,Y,Z)-X(t;η,Ϋ,Z)\\2
(2.4) < K3 ί\\ Y(s) - Ϋ(s) \\ + I Z{s) - Z{s) \l) ds,
Jo
with K3 independent of 77, t and ω E Ω.
For the continuity w.r.to time, we need finer calculations using structural
condition.
Proposition 2.3.
(2.5) E(\X(t^Y,Z)-X(s η^Z)\2B)<K,{l + \\η\\2)\t-s\
(2.6) E (sup \\X(t 77, y, Z) - r/||4) < X4(sup | | e t A 77 - ry||4 + θ2),
t<θ t<θ
where K± is independent of 77, Y and Z.
Proof. Since we see (2.5) in Proposition 2.4 in [7], we will only prove (2.6).
Putting X(t) = X(t] η, Y, Z) and ξ(t) = X(t) - etAη, we have
dξ(t) = (Aξ{t) + β(X(t),Y(t),Z{t))dt + dM(t), for 0<t<T,
with initial condition ξ(0) — 0.
From the coercive condition, we see
< (2(r + l)\\Φ)\? + k)dt + 2(ξ(t),dM(t)),
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with a constant k. Hence we get
and
t<θ t<θ Jo
Taking the square of both sides, we obtain
e
-
2
^
r
^
s
 (ξ(s), dM (s)))2/
t<θ t<θ Jo
Since a martingale inequality derives
t<θ
/
Jθ
(ξ{s),βi)2ds
rθ
<4m / e-^r+1
Jo
the above calculations yield
£supe- 4 ( r + 1 ) ί | | ξ (*) | | 4 < hθ2, for 0<θ<T.
t<θ
Now we complete the proof of (2.6), recalling the definition of ξ(t). •
Setting τ(η,d) = exit time from the ball of radius d centered at 77, and fixing
small 0(77, d) such that
(2.7) ΘKdQβsuvle^l)-1 and sup \\etΛη - η\\ < ^,
t<§ ό
where I I means the operator norm, we get (2.8), by (2.6),
(2.8) P ( τ ( η , d ) <s) < K5s2d~4 whenever s < θ(η,d),
where K§ is independent of 77, d, Y and Z.
3. Value functions
First of all, we define strategies of players.
DEFINITION 3.1. An admissible strategy a (resp. 7) of player I (resp. II)
is a mapping a : Z -> y (resp. 7 : y-> Z), which is (B[0,Γ] x F,B(Y))-
measurable and non-anticipative, namely
if P(Z(s) = Z(5)) = 1 /or 5 < ί, ^en P(aZ(t) = aZ(t)) = 1.
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(resp. if P(Y(s) = Ϋ(s)) = 1 for s < ί, then P(jY{t) = jΫ{t)) = 1).
Λ (resp. TZ) denotes the set of admissible strategies of player I (resp.
II). Putting ω~ = cjt~ and CJ4" = ωf for simplicity and Z^-^jUΓ1") =
Z(θ + t, (u;~,α;+)) for θ G [0,Γ — ί], we note that Z^- can be regarded as an
admissible control of player II on Ω
τ
_t, for almost all ω~ £ Ω£. But, it is a
ploblem whether a(Z
ω
- )(#, ω+) is measurable w.r.to (θ, α;~, u;"1"), as Fleming and
Souganidis pointed out [4]. Therefore we introduce some restrictive class where
the measurability holds.
DEFINITION 3.2. ([4]). When a(e Λ) satisfies the following additional
property (R), we call α an r-strategy of player I.
(R). For any t e ( 0 , T ) and Z e Z, the mapping: (θ,ω)-> a(Z
ω
-)(θ,ω+),
is (B[0,Γ - t] x F,B(Y))-measurable.
A denotes the set of r-strategies of player I. Similarly, we define r-strategy
of player II with their collection denoted by R. Replacing Λ and ΊZ in the
definitions (1.3) and (1.4) by A and R respectively, we define r-value functions.
DEFINITION 3.3.
r-upper value function U(t,η) = sup
α ( Ξ A inf^G£ J(t,η;a,Z)
r-lower value function \i(t,η) = inf7eR,supye;y J(t, 77; Y, 7)
where J(t,η a,Z) = J(t,η\aZ,Z) and J(t,η\Y,j) = J(t,η]Y,jY).
From (2.3) and (2.5), we can easily see
Proposition 3.1.
(3.1) \J(t,η;Y,Z)\<hT + q
( 3 . 2 ) \ J ( t ,
m
Y , Z ) - J ( s Λ ; Y , Z ) \ < K 6 [ \ η - C\B + (1 + \\η\\W\t ~ s\]
where KQ is independent of Y and Z.
Hence, both of U(ί,η) and u(t,η) also satisfy (3.1) and (3.2).
Proposition 3.2.
Upper-optimality dynamic programming principle
(3.3)
sup inf E[ / h(X(s; η, a, Z),aZ(s), Z(s)) ds + U(ί - Θ,X{Θ; η, a, Z)) ] < U(ί, η)
aeAZ^z Jo
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Sub-optimality dynamic programming principle
(3.4)
inf sup
Proof. Using B-norm, we can apply the standard method because of condition
(R). So, we only give an outline for (3.3), since (3.4) is proved in a similar way.
We set W(t,η) = the right hand side of (3.3). For ε > 0, there is ά G A
such that
fθ
W(t,η)<E[ h(X(s;η,α, Z),αZ(«), Z(s)) ds + U(ί - θ,X{θ;η,a,
Jo
(3.5) for any Z e Z,
On the other hand, there is aζ G A such that
-θχ)< inf J ( t - f l ,C;α
c
,Z)+ε.
Dividing H = Ujli ^j w ^ n B-diam.(Aj) < -^- and choosing ζj G Aj
arbitrarily, we define α* by
oo
ά,Z,ω-))α^
where α^ = α^., /^ = indicator of set A and ω~ = CJ "^, u;+ = α j " . Since ά
and (Xj are r-strategies, α* is also r-strategy. Moreover, (3.2) yields
(3.6) U(ί - fl, 0 < inf J(ί - 0, £ αj, Z) + 3ε /or ξ € A, ,
Hence, from (3.5) and (3.6), we see for Z G Z
fθ
W(t,η) <E[
3 = 1
Since Z is arbitrary,
ί, ry) < inf J(ί, /;; α*, Z) + 5ε < U(ί, ry) + 5ε.
ZξZ
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This completes the proof of (3.3). D
4. Isaacs equations
We recall the definition of viscosity solution of Isaacs equations [2], putting
F+(η,p,Q) = - mfsup[(jp,β(η,y,z))+h(η,y,z)]- \trace(SQ)
z e z γ 1
and
F~{η,p,Q) = - s u p inϊ[(p,β(η,y,z)) + h(η,y,z)}- -trace(SQ)
where p E H and Q E L(H) (=the Banach space of bounded linear operators
equipped with the operator norm I I).
Φ € C12((0,T) x H) is called a test function, if
(i). Φ is weakly lower semi-continuous and bounded from below, and
(ii). dΦ(t,η) e H2 and both of dΦ and A*dΦ are continuous.
g G C2(H) is called radial, if g(η) — g{\\η\\) with g E C2[0,oo) increasing
from 0 to 00.
By virtue of (A1)~(A3), there is a constant μ > 0 such that
(-AζΛ)+μ\\ζ\\2>0 for ζeH1.
Hence, —A = —A + μl is dissipative. Putting β(η,y,z) = β(η,y,z) -f μη,
we can replace A and β in the Isaacs equations (1.5) and (1.6) by A and β
respectively. Moreover noting
swp(d(Φ + g)(t,η),β(η,y,z)) -
yeY
we have the definition 4.1, according to [2].
DEFINITION 4.1. V e C([0,Γ] x H) is called a sub-solution (resp. super-
solution) of (1.5), if V(0,r/) = q(η) and the following condition (1) (resp.(2)) holds
for any test function Φ and radial function g,
(1). If V — Φ — g has a local maximum at (i,ή) G (0,Γ) x H, then
(2). If V H- Φ + g has a local minimum at (i, ή) E (0, T) x H, then
8Φ
- — (ί,η)+(A*dΦ(t,ή),η)+F+(ή, -d(Φ+g)(t,η), -d2(Φ+g)(t,η)) > -μg'
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V is called a viscosity solution, if it is both a sub- and super-solution.
Replacing F+ by F~, we define a viscosity solution of (1.6). Since our
value functions are B-continuous, local maximum (resp.minimum) can be replaced
by strictly local maximum (resp. minimum) in Definition 4.1,[3].
Theorem 4.1.
(i). U is a super-solution of (1.5), and (ii). u is a sub-solution of (1.6).
Proof. We only prove (i), because (ii) follows in a similar way.
Appealing to the super-optimality (3.3), we employ a routine method. So,
we only show the outline of proof.
Supose U + Φ + g has a local minimum at (£, 77), say
(4.1)
V(i,ή) + Φ(i,ή)+g(ή)<V(t,η)+Φ(t,η)+g(η), for 11 - t \,\\η - η\\ < δ.
F o r έ > 0, t h e r e is δ > 0, s u c h t h a t if | ί - ί | < < 5 a n d | | r ? - ^ | | < « 5 t h e n
(4-2) \f(t,η)-f(t,ή)\<έ,
where f = Φ,g, ^ , <9Φ, dg, A*<9Φ, 92Φ, d2g and | | means their own norms.
Let us set δ = min(ί, δ) and r =exit time form the closed ball of radius δ
centered at ή. Putting
dΦ 1
λ = aj-(M) " (A*dΦ(t,ή),η) - -trace SΘ2(Φ + g)(t,ή) - μ(dg(η),ή)
and using (2.8), (4.1), (4.2) and Itό's formula, we obtain
JS[U(ί-fl,X(fl;^α,Z))-U(ί,η); r > θ]
(4.3)
>XΘ-E[ f (Θ(Φ + g)(iή),β(ή,aZ(s),Z(s)))ds] - hVθ3δ~2 - k2(ε + δ)θ,Jo
for θ < θ(ή,δ), (see (2.7)), where k\ and k<ι are independent of a and Z. On
the other hand, (2.8) yields
(4.4)
E[Ό(t-θ,X(θ;ή,a,Z))-V(i,ή);τ<θ] > -2(ΛΓ + q)P{τ < θ) > -k3θ2δ~4.
Now, (4.3) and (4.4) together with the super-optimality dynamic programming
principle yield
(4.5)
0 > sup inf E[ ί F(aZ(s), Z{s)) ds] + λθ- kA-/f δ~2 - k5(έ + δ)θ,
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where
F{y,z) = h{η,y,z) - (d(Φ + g)(t,ή),β(ή,y,z)).
Assume that there is a positive c such that
λ + inf sup F(y,z) > c.
zezyeY
From Lipshitz continuity of h and β, it follows that there is Δ > 0, such that
)\<l if \z-z\<A.
λ
Thus dividing Z = U^ 1 Zj with diam.(Zj) < Δ and fixing Zj G Zj arbitrarily,
we can take yj such that
F{yj,zά)>c-λ, j = l,2,. .JV.
Let us define ά : Z ->• y by
N
aZ(t,ω) = ΣyjI
3=1
Then,
Noting
(4.8)
& e
(4-
A
5),
and
inf E[
we thus get
o>
r
θ
2 "
For έ, δ < gj^ and small ^, (4.7) contradicts to c > 0. Hence Theorem 4.1,(i)
holds. D
In [7], we constructed the unique viscosity solutions V (resp.v) of (1.5)
(resp. (1.6)), as follows. Putting Δ = 2~NT, N = 1,2, , we call Z(e Z) a Δ-step
control, if Z{t) = z for t G [0,Δ) and Z(t) = Z(feΔ) for t G [λΔ,(* + 1)Δ).
ZN denotes the set of Δ-step controls of player II. j(e ΊZ) is called Δ-step,
if ηY G ZN and 7F(ί)., ί G [0, Δ), does not depend on Y. TZj^f denotes their
collection. Let us define
VN(t,η)= inf sup J(t,η]Y,'y).
Then, VN is decreasing and satisfies the evaluations (3.1) and (3.2). Moreover,
the limit function, V(t,η) — limiγ_^ oo Vjγ(^ ry), is the unique viscosity solution of
(1.5). Therefore from the comparison theorem [9], it follows that
U(t,η)>V(t,η)>V(t,η).
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Next we will show the opposite inequality, U(t,η) < V(t,η). Since, for any
a £ A and 7 e TZN, there exist Ϋ £ y and Z £ ZN such that aZ = Ϋ
and ηY — Z, (see (2.5) in [4]), we get
sup J(t, η; y, 7) > J(t, η; y, 7) = J(t, 77; α, Z) > inf J(t, 77; α, Z).
Hence, for any α G i , we have
VN(t,η)> inf J(*,η;α,Z).
Taking supremum w.r.to α and letting TV tend to 00, we get the opposite inequality
U(t,η) < V(t,η), which yields U(t,η) = V(t,η). •
Consequently, we obtain the main theorem,
Theorem 4.2. The upper value function U (resp. lower value function
u) is the unique viscosity solution of (1.5) (resp. (1.6)), in C&([0,T] x Hw) (=
the set of bounded weakly continuous functions).
Collary. Under Isaacs condition, our stochastic differential game has the
value.
Recalling the definitions of value functions, we see
U(t,η) = lim VN(t,η) = inf sup J{t,η;Y,η) > u(t,η).
N-ϊoo £UΊZ Y
Hence, if U(t,η) - u(t,η) (= c put) > 0, then for any step strategy 7(6
sup J(ί,?/;y,7) >u(t,η) + c.
Yey
Namely, 7 can not be nearly optimal.
5. Application to sensitive control
Regarding a controller as player II, we will consider the following stochastic
control. For ε > 0, when a controller applies an admissible control Z, the
system ξε and the pay-off Jε are given by (5.1) and (5.2) respectively,
(5.1) dξε(t) = (Aξε(t) + δ(ξε(t), Z{t))) at + v/εdAf (ί), 0 < t < Γ,
with initial condition ζε(O)=η (G H),
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and
(5.2) Jε(t,η Z) =E(exp- ί f(ξε(s))ds)
£ Jo
where δ and / are bounded and Lipshitz continuous.
Let us define the value vunction Wε by
Wε(t,η)= inf Jε(t,η;Z).
Then Wε is the unique viscosity solution of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
(5.3),
dW 1
— (t,η) - (A*dW(t,η),η) - inf (dW(t,η),δ(η,z)) - -f(η)W(t,η)
(5.3) -Urace Sd2W (t, η) =0, 0<t<T, η £ H,
with initial condition W(0) = 1.
Hence its logarithmic transformation vε
u%t,η)=εlogWε(t,η)
is the unique viscosity solution of (5.4) in C&([0,T] x Hw) >
dv
— (t,η) - (A*dv{t,η),η) - inf {dv(t,η),δ(η,z)) - f(η)
Oi zξzL
(5.4)
~(Sdv(t,η)>dv(t,η))-^traceSd2v(t,η)=O, 0 < t < T, η E H,
with initial condition u(0) = 0.
But, (5.4) turns out to be the Isaacs equation (1.7) by Legendre transformation.
Moreover, we showed [6] that the small noise limit of z/ε, say v, exists and turns
out to be the unique viscosity solution of (1.7) with ε = 0, which coincides with
the value function of deterministic differential game on H.
Since H is not compact, we will introduce admissible controls and strategies
of stochastic differential game associated with (1.7) as follows. Putting Λ =
Λ/5, we set YN = {Λ( G # ; ||C|| < N}. Then YN is compact.
Replacing Y in previous sections by Y#, we denote the set of admissible
controls and strategies by 3 ^ &nd AN respectively. Let us set
oo oo oo
Y = U YJV, y= \JyN, A= \j AN,
ΛΓ=1 N=l JV=1
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β(η,y,z) = δ(η,z)+Ay, h(η,y) = f(η) - ±\\y\\2.
When players I and II apply admissible controls Y and Z respectively, the system
Xε evolves according to stochastic differential equation,
dXε(t) = (AXε(t) + β(Xε(t), Y(t), Z(t))) dt + y/εdM(t), 0 < t < Γ,
with initial condition Xε(0) = η (E iϊ"),
and the pay-oίf J e is defined by
Jε(t,η;Y,Z) = E / /ι(X£(5;7y,y, Z),F(s)) ds.
Using similar notations as before, we define
U
ΛΓ(^^) — mf S UP e/e (ί, 77; y, /^)
Then, we have
ί7ε(ί,r/) = sup inf Jε(t,η;a,Z) = lim UεN(t,η)
u
ε(t,η)= inf sup Jε(t,η;Y, 7) > lim uεN(t,η).
iZTZYy ΛΓ->-oo
From Theorem 4.2, it follows that UεN — u
ε
N and they are unique viscosity
solutions of the following Isaacs equation,
^(t,η) - (A*dU(t,η),η) - mϊ(dU(t,η),δ(η,z)) - f(η)
OX zζ.L
—trace Sd2U(t,η) - sup ((dU(t,η),Aζ) - hζ\\2) = 0, 0 < t < Γ,
λ
 ζeYN
 z
with initial condition U(0) = 0.
Proposition 5.1. Putting / = sup^
€JH-1 /(C) I? we have | UεN{t,η) \ < ft.
Proof. Since the strategy 0 belongs to AN,
UεN(t,η)> inϊ Jε(t,η-,0,Z)>-ft
ZξiZ
holds. Noting h( ) < f, we complete the proof. •
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Proposition 5.2.
I UεN(t, η) - UεN(s, 0 I < c\ η - ζ \B + f\ t - s \
with a constant c, independent of N and ε.
Proof. In a similar way as (2.3), we get
/ \\Xε{t η,Y,Z)-Xε(t f
ί
,Y,Z)\\2ds<c1\ η-ή\%
o
with ci independent of Y, Z, N, ε and ω E ft. Hence we have
(5.5) s u p I UεN(t,η) - UεN{t,ζ)\<c\η-ζ\B.
t<τ
Next we evaluate the continuity w.r.to t, using similar arguments as in [1],
For ε > 0, taking α* = a*(s,η,έ) E AN such that
UεN(s,η) < inf Jε(s,η',a*,Z)+έ,
ZζZ
and defining ά E AN by
άZ(θ)=a*Z(θ) for 0 € [ O , « ) , = 0 for flG[s,Γ],
we have
(5.6)
UεN(t,η)-UεN(s,η)> mi Je{t,η;ά,Z)- inΐ Je(s,η;ά,Z) - έ >-f(t - s) - ε.
ZξiZ ZζZ
Choosing a = ά(t,η,ε) E AN and Z e Z such that
and
inf Jε(t,η;ά,Z) > Jε{t,η;ά,Z) - ε,
we have
UεN(t,η)-UεN{s,η)< inf Jε(t,η;ά,Z) - inf Jε(s,η;ά,Z) + ε
(5.7) < Jε{t,η\ά,Z) - J£(s^;a,Z) + 2ε < /(ί - s) + 2ε.
Now, Proposition 5.2 follows from (5.5),(5.6) and (5.7). D
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Since UεN(t,η) is increasing to Uε(t,η), as N ->- oo, Propositions 5.1 and
5.2 yield the following theorem,
Theorem 5.1. As TV -> oo, ί/^  is increasing to Uε uniformly on any
bounded set of [0,T] x iJ. Moreover, Vs is bounded and B-coninuous and
the unique viscosity solution of (1.7) in C&([0,T] x Hw)
Recalling that vε is the unique viscosity solution of (1.7), we have
Theorem 5.2. vε has a min-max expression
v
ε(t,η) = sup inf Jε(t,η;a,Z) (= [/ε(*,77)).
For ε = 0, we define X°, J° and [7° in a similar way. Then we get by
standard arguments
snPE(\\Xε(t;η,Y,Z)-X°(t;η,Y,Z)\\2)<c3ε
t<τ
with a constant c$ independent of 77, Y and Z. So, we have
(5.8) \Uε(t,η)-U°(t,η)\<c^
with a constant c4 independent of t and 77. Therefore U
ε
 converges to
U° uniformly, as ε —> 0. Form this fact, it follows that U° is the unique
viscosity solution of (1.7) with ε = 0. Consequently U° = v. Now,
(5.8) yields the speed of convergence of vε.
Theorem 5.3. There is a constant c independent of t and 77, such
that
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